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Introduction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.' Article III of the
Constitution and various legislative acts, including the Judiciary Act of
1789, set forth the limits of their power.2 The two most common types
of federal jurisdiction are federal question and diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction.3 Although federal question jurisdiction is a relatively clear
limit on judicial power, diversity of citizenship has, at times, been an in-
consistent standard. Federal subject matterjirisdiction is not a matter of
1 Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over three general areas of cases: 1) cases
involving questions of federal law (commonly called federal question jurisdiction) 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982); 2) cases involving citizens of different states with a certain amount in controversy (commonly
called diversity jurisdiction) 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); and 3) cases involving questions of admiralty,
maritime or prize issues, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). A detailed listing of the specific areas of original
district court jurisdiction is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1366 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2 U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. I which states in relevant part: "The judicial Power shall extend to
all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.";Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73 (1789) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)).
3 See supra note 1. "Federal question jurisdiction" is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) and
grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over cases "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." Id.
The "arising under" language has been given different construction under the Constitutional grant
ofjudicial authority set forth at U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The seminal case construing "arising under" in the Constitutional sense is Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the Court stated:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended
by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of the
Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of
fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id at 823.
The Supreme Court has construed "arising under" in the statutory sense to mean:
[W]here it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends
upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the
District Court has jurisdiction under this provision.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
The "arising under" language has been limited where questions of federal law are merely "lurk-
ing in the background." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 105, 117 (1936). Furthermore, the
federal question jurisdiction must be clear from a well pleaded complaint. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Mottley Co., 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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judicial discretion, 4 but requires that courts apply a system of jurisdic-
tional statutes. 5
These jurisdictional statutes are fundamental to the federal courts'
exercise of power because federal courts cannot adjudicate cases without
subject matter jurisdiction. 6 Therefore, jurisdictional principles should
keep in step with the changes in our society. 7 Judicial discretion and
multiple interpretations cannot stand up to the strictures of article III or
the express jurisdictional grants from Congress.
Until recently, the federal courts employed two theories for estab-
lishing the citizenship of a limited partnership8 in order to determine
diversity jurisdiction:9 mandatory consideration I and real party in inter-
4 From early on, the Supreme Court has clearly mandated that federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion (especially diversity jurisdiction) is a doctrine requiring strict adherence by the courts which can
neither be waived nor stipulated to by the parties.
It is . . . well established that when jurisdiction depends upon diverse citizenship the ab-
sence of sufficient averments or of facts in the record showing such required diversity of
citizenship is fatal and cannot be overlooked by the court, even if the parties fail to call
attention to the defect, or consent that it may be waived.
Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207, 211 (1906).
5 Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) (When dealing with the issue ofjurisdictional
amount in a diversity case, the Court said: "[t]he policy of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction
upon the district court calls for its strict construction").
6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) which states in relevant part: "[a] pleading.., shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends."
7 Such a progression on the part of the Supreme Court's analysis has taken place concerning
corporations. Initially the Court discussed corporations by stating:
A corporation is composed of natural persons; it is a visible, tangible body; and although
the whole collectively have faculties in law which the individuals have not, yet it does not
follow that the whole body may not be seen, examined, sifted, and contemplated, as any
other body of individuals having collectively a particular faculty. [citation omitted] The indi-
viduals hold their rights as members in their natural, and not in a politic capacity. A corpora-
tion is a mere collection of men having collectively certain faculties.
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64-5 (1809) (emphasis in original). As the
Court's analysis progressed, it viewed corporations more substantively in Marshall v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853). When discussing the diversity standing of corporations in that
case, the Court stated:
The inference, also, that such an artificial entity [as a corporation] 'cannot be a citizen,' is a
logical conclusion from the premise which cannot be denied.
But a citizen who has made a contract, and has a 'controversy' with a corporation, may
also say, with equal truth, that he did not deal with a mere metaphysical abstraction, but
with natural persons; that his writ has not been served on an imaginary entity, but on men
and citizens; and that his contract was made with them as the legal representatives of nu-
merous unknown associates, or secret and dormant partners.
The necessities and conveniences of trade and business require that such numerous
associates and stockholders should act by representation, and have the faculty of con-
tracting, suing, and being sued in a factitious or collective name. But these important facul-
ties, conferred upon them by state legislation, for their own convenience, cannot be wielded
to deprive others of acknowledged rights. It is not reasonable that those who deal with such persons would
be deprived of a valuable privilege by syllogism, or rather sophism, which deals subtly with words and
names, without regard to the things or persons they are used to represent.
Marshall, 57 U.S. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
8 A limited partnership is:
A type of partnership comprised of one or more general partners who manage business and
who are personally liable for partnership debts, and one or more limited partners who con-
tribute capital and share in profits but who take no part in running business and incur no
liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond contribution.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 836 (5th Ed. 1979).
9 "Diversity jurisdiction", as it will be used in this Note, means federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion over cases between citizens of different states currently codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Sec-
tion 1332 states, in relevant part:
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est. I Courts applying the mandatory consideration theory determine di-
versity on the basis of the citizenships of all partners, general and
limited, in a limited partnership. Since the theory bars national-scope
limited partnerships from federal courts, it prevents matters of national
concern from being adjudicated in a national forum.1 2
In contrast, courts using the real party in interest theory determine
the citizenship of a limited partnership based only on those partners that
are real parties in interest. These real parties are defined on a case-by-
case analysis of a state's limited partnership law concerning capacity to
sue and be sued on behalf of the limited partnership. This is not to say
that courts apply a different legal standard in each case. Rather, a deter-
mination is made from case to case concerning the limited partners' ca-
pacity to sue and be sued based on state limited partnership law.13 When
courts apply the real party in interest theory in this manner, they gener-
ally find that the citizenship of general partners alone should be consid-
ered in making a determination of diversity jurisdiction. Therefore,
limited partnerships in states like New York, 14 where limited partners are
specifically held not to be proper parties to a suit by or for the limited
partnership, would have greater diversity potential than limited partner-
ships from states like Missouri,1 5 where limited partners are not specifi-
cally held to be improper parties to a suit by or for the limited
partnership.
The Supreme Court recently unified the standard to be used to de-
termine diversity citizenship of limited partnerships. In Carden v. Arkoma
Associates,16 the Court upheld mandatory consideration as the proper
standard to be used. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Scalia stated for the
majority:
"(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions ... between
(1) citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982).
In light of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), § 1332 has been interpreted as
requiring "complete diversity" between adverse parties. In Strawbridge the Court said, "each distinct
interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the
federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest
must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts." Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at
267.
10 See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mandatory consideration
theory.
11 See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the real party interest theory.
12 See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of how national-scope limited
partnerships are not amenable to nor have the availability of diversity jurisdiction.
It should be noted that any mention of a limited partnership's non-access to federal court also
contemplates that an adverse party would not be able to take a limited partnership to federal court.
Further, such a litigant would suffer in the same manner as a limited partnership kept from federal
adjudication.
13 Because the real party in interest test requires analysis of state law to determine capacity for
suit, the test raises questions involving the choice of law doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938) and general conflicts of law. The position advocated in this Note raises no such
questions because it would establish a uniform federal standard for determining the citizenship of
limited partnerships, alleviating the need to consult varying state laws.
14 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966) (construing New York
law).
15 See Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1988) (construing Missouri law).
16 58 U.S.L.W. 4243 (1990).
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We have never held that an artificial entity, suing or being sued in its
own name, can invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts
based on the citizenship of some but not all of its members. 17
Considering the structure and national scope of the modem limited
partnership, mandatory consideration is too confining and inequitable.
Reliance on varying state laws to determinefederal jurisdiction under the
real party in interest test fails to provide limited partnerships with the
equal treatment they deserve.18 As it did with corporations, Congress
must develop a uniformfederal standard for determiningfederal diversity
jurisdiction over cases involving limited partnerships.
This Note advocates departing from both historical methods of anal-
ysis and using a new approach for determining diversity status of limited
partnerships. This new approach calls for Congress to amend the diver-
sity rules to consider a limited partnership a citizen of its state of organi-
zation and its principal place of business. Part I will trace the historical
underpinnings of limited partnerships and diversity jurisdiction. Part II
will analyze the two current methods of determining the citizenship of
limited partnerships for diversity purposes. Part III will advocate that
modern limited partnerships are, in fact, pseudo-corporations, and lim-
ited partners are analogous to corporate shareholders. Part IV will con-
sider the supporting and countervailing policy considerations behind
adopting a new theory for determining diversity for limited partnerships.
I. The Evolution of Limited Partnerships and Diversity Jurisdiction
A. Limited Partnerships-Historically
The modern limited partnership, with its potentially national scope,
was not envisioned when the entity came into existence in France (Com-
mandite) and Italy (Accomandita) in the 17th century. 19 French business-
men introduced the entity to America during the French possession of
Louisiana and Florida.20 Original limited partnerships in Europe and
America had a purpose and design different than that of today's limited
partnerships.
Early limited partnerships were construed as trusts. 2 1 Often, a gen-
eral partner would have wealthy persons contribute to his enterprise.
The investors enjoyed the possibility of profit but incurred no third party
liability. These contributors then had a right to have their money man-
aged by the general partner or entrepreneur. 22 Therefore, early limited
partners were, in fact, merely beneficiaries and construing them as part-
ners was seen as a mistake: "[T]he person who is termed, in our system,
the special [limited] partner, is not called a partner, at all, by jurists
abroad. Neither is he a partner; and the [sic] considering him as such,
17 Carden, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4245.
18 See supra notes 4-5.
19 S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 53.0, 550 (1960) [hereinafter ROWLEY]; F. TROUBAT,
THE LAW OF COMANDATARY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (1853) [hereinafter
TROUBAT].
20 ROWLEY, supra note 19, at 550.
21 TROUBAT, supra note 19, at 34.
22 Id. at 36.
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from the name, may be, as it has been, productive of error, in the United
States." 23 Others considered limited partners to be creditors of the gen-
eral partner(s):
In this species of association... the dominion andjusformale of the
business vests in the general partner, who possesses the mastership,
the exclusive and entire use of the money or other property intrusted to
him, and of the business committed to his care; and the special [lim-
ited] partner is neither the master nor the joint possessor, but merely
the creditor of the capital which he has contributed. 24
New York enacted the first state limited partnership provision in
1822.25 The New York statute, as well as those passed by thirty other
states, sought to create the limited liability necessary to make limited
partnerships viable business alternatives. 26 The reason underlying such
specific statutory provisions was the fear that, because limited partners
shared in profits, they would become defacto general partners subject to
unlimited personal liability.2 7 This statutory limitation of liability was a
significant and novel departure from the English and American common
law of partnership. 28
The next step in the progression of limited partnership law was the
drafting and presentation of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA) in 1916.29 When the ULPA was presented, limited partnerships
were not safe investment alternatives because of the disparate treatment
given to limited partnerships and limited partners under the various state
statutes.30 To this end, the ULPA contained seven features which pro-
tected limited partners.3' As early as half a century prior to the presenta-
tion of the ULPA, the Supreme Court of Connecticut set forth the policy
which underlies limited partnership today:3 2
23 Id. at 35.
24 Id. at 38 (emphasis in original).
25 ROWLEY, supra note 19, at 550.
26 Id
27 Id. See also UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT [hereinafter ULPA] § 1, official comment, 6
U.L.A. 561 (1916).
28 Rowley, supra note 19, at 550. This law was considered a departure due to the fact that Eng-
lish and American common law did not recognize any limited partner or partnerships. See, e.g., Row-
land v. Long, 45 Md. 439, 446 (1876):
[I]t is well settled, we think, that where two persons agree to carry on a trade or business for
their mutual benefit, one to furnish the money and the other to perform certain labor and
services, [Rowland and Long agreed to have only one of them be liable while the other only
gave services to the entity] and each to share the profits to be derived from such trade or
business, they become liable as partners to third persons, although in fact no partnership was
contemplated by the parties themselves.
Id (emphasis in original).
29 See supra note 27.
30 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 1, official comment. Because state courts misinterpreted specific
state limited partnership acts, limited partners were not given limited liability and the investment
was unsafe. To prevent such misinterpretation, there were two manifest assumptions behind the
ULPA's presentation: 1) Public policy does not require that one who contributes capital to a business
endeavor with limited or no control over the business should be placed in a position of personal
liability; and 2) Persons in business should be able to bring in capital from outside investors with the
ability to shield those investors from liability while remaining personally liable themselves. Id.
31 See ULPA, supra note 27, official comment.
32 The two most recent developments in limited partnerships have been the presentation of the
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr [hereinafter RULPA] in 1976 and 1985, see RULPA, 6
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We find a clear general purpose and intent by the legislature to en-
courage trade by authorizing and permitting a capitalist to put his
money into a partnership with general partners possessed of skill and
business character only, without becoming a general partner or haz-
arding anything in the business except the capital originally
subscribed.3 3
Thus, the modern limited partner is little more than an investor, much
like a corporate shareholder.3 4
B. Diversity-Historically 35
When the delegates gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to hammer out
the provisions for a new constitution, the judicial power of the national
government was of major concern. The absence of a strong, organized
national judiciary was a weakness of the Articles of Confederation, 36 and
all the proposals submitted to the convention provided for a national
judicial system.3 7 Only the comprehensive plan proposed by the State
of Virginia, however, specifically conferred diversity jurisdiction by ex-
tending the power of the national judiciary to cases where "citizens of
other States" were a party. 38 The Virginia plan received the bulk of the
convention's attention. The convention, as a committee of the whole,
considered Virginia's proposal for the federal judiciary. 39 While the lan-
guage which emerged from the committee of the whole and went to the
Committee of Detail vested diversity jurisdiction "to such other ques-
tions as may involve the national peace and harmony," 40 it returned from
the Committee as "controversies... between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or
U.L.A. 220 (West Supp. 1989), as well as the birth of the Master Limited Partnership (MLP) business
entity. See infra note 110 for a definition of a MLP. The RULPA was drafted to modernize the law of
limited partnership. See RULPA prefatory note (1985). Structurally, RULPA clears up ambiguities
in the ULPA and extends the powers of derivative actions to limited partners.
The original Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the impetus of the rise of the MLP. See Note, Tax
Reform 1986 Fuels the Rise of Master Limited Partnership, 9 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 217 (1988). The entity
itself began in 1981. Id. at 218. Structurally, the MLP is a conglomerate of other partnerships. Id.
It was originally used in the gas and oil industry; however, today the MLP is used in large real estate
syndicates, shopping center developments and even in the procuring of shares of professional sports
teams. Id. at 219.
33 Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 463, 466 (1868) (cited in ROWLEY, supra note 19, at 549).
34 See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
35 For a more detailed treatment of this area, see Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28
ILL. L. REV. 356 (1933); Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483
(1928); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1964);
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
36 THE FORMATION AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETA-
TIONS 149-51 (K. HALL, ed. 1987). See also M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 50
(1913) ("There ought to be an organized federal judiciary which should have, in addition to that
developed under the articles of confederation, jurisdiction in matters relating to foreigners or peo-
ple of other states."); C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (1928) ("The
experience under the Confederation amply demonstrated the necessity of defining and firmly estab-
lishing the Federal judicial power."); Moore & Weckstein, supra note 35, at 2.
37 Moore & Weckstein, supra note 35, at 2 n.3.
38 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, (C. TANSILL, ed.),
H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 955 (1927) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS]; Moore & Weckstein,
supra note 35, at 2-3.
39 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 72.
40 Id. at 119; Moore & Weckstein, supra note 35, at 3.
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subjects."' 4 ' Despite the extended debate that went into framing the di-
versity language, the revised language received little debate on the floor
and was passed easily.4 2
The framers believed diversity jurisdiction was necessary because
they shared an over-arching concern that state courts dealt with citizens
of other states unfairly.43 However, public opinion at that time, as well as
opinion today, has been mixed as to the desirability or even the necessity
of federal diversity jurisdiction. 44
41 Farrand, supra note 36, at 155-56; Moore & Weckstein, supra note 35, at 3; DOCUMENTS, supra
note 36, at 479.
42 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 155-56.
43 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 8-9 (1928); L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGrr? 187 (1975); 2
SLATrERY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 133 (1906); Ball, supra note 35, at 357.
ChiefJustice Marshall stated in Deveaux:
The judicial department was introduced into the American constitution under impres-
sions, and with views, which are too apparent not to be perceived by all. However true the
fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of
the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears
and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of
controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87.
Madison said, "It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise in some states, against the
citizens of others, who may have claims against them." 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TU-rIoN 391 (1828) (cited in Ball, supra note 35, at 357).
These statements have also been construed as being indicative of a less than enthusiastic belief
in the need for diversity. "The very form in which the argument is stated throws doubts on the
sincerity of those propounding it. Madison does not point out any specific examples of prejudice,
does not allege that any exist; Marshall even gives the innuendo that none do exist." Friendly, supra
note 35, at 493.
No such doubts are readily apparent. The Constitution, by its very nature, was drafted with
possibilities and fears in mind. The Framers were required to look to the future and predict its
problems and the remedies therefor. To challenge the statements of Madison and Marshall because
of a lack of "specific examples of prejudice," takes an unmerited academic approach to a pragmatic
situation. ChiefJustice Marshall was a part of the convention and knew of the debate surrounding
the structure of the national judiciary and could very easily have sought to limit the clause through
interpretation or even discredit it. Such was not done.
44 George Mason stated as one of his reasons for not signing the new Constitution:
The Judiciary of the United States is so construed and extended, as to absorb and
destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate and
expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.
2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 638 (1911) (cited in Friendly, supra note 35,
at 489).
Patrick Henry also prophesied doom:
I see arising out of that paper, a tribunal, that is to be recurred to in all cases, when the
destruction of the state judiciaries shall happen; and from the extensive jurisdiction of those
paramount courts, the state courts must soon be annihilated.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 397 (cited in Friendly, supra note 35, at 489).
Neither of these concerns is well-founded due to the concurrent nature ofjurisdiction between
states and the federal judiciary in diversity cases. Friendly, supra note 35, at 489.
However; while some advocate a limitation or even abolition of diversity, see Doub, Time for Re-
Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdirtion?, 46 A.B.A. J. 959 (1960); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66 A.B.A. J. 177 (1980), others argue for its retention, see Brown, The
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1929); Frank, The
Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 403 (1979).
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Congress specifically enacted provisions for diversity jurisdiction in
the Judiciary Act of 178945 and narrowed the diversity language, pursu-
ant to its constitutional power, to confer jurisdiction in cases where "an
alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another State."'46 This language tightened
the power which the Convention had conferred on the national judiciary
through the Constitution.47
Originally, access to federal courts under diversity jurisdiction was a
right reserved for individuals.48 The Judiciary Act failed to define "citi-
zen" 49 and the Supreme Court construed it narrowly, excluding entities
such as corporations. 50 Half a century later, however, in Marshall v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. Co. ,51 the Court proclaimed a corporation to be a citizen
of its state of incorporation. 52
45 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982)). See infra note 46.
46 Id. at 78. Congress has near plenary power to determine the jurisdictional power of district
courts. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("All federal courts, other than the
Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to 'ordain and
establish' inferior courts as conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution").
47 Article III of the Constitution confers power on the federal judiciary in cases and controver-
sies "between Citizens of different States."
TheJudiciary Act of 1789 curtailed that jurisdiction to be given to citizens of states other than
the state where the suit was brought.
Current codification under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) retains the original language of the Consti-
tution and confers jurisdiction in cases between Citizens of different States.
The difference in the two provisions is striking. For example, under the Judiciary Act, a citizen
of New York would not be diverse to a citizen of Florida unless the suit was brought in New York or
Florida. Suit in any other state would destroy diversity status. Such a suit in any state would still be
diverse under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
48 See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) in which the Court stated:
Aliens, or citizens of different states, are not less susceptible of these apprehensions [which
lead to a desire for "national tribunals"], nor can they be supposed to be less the objects of
constitutional provision, because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name. That name,
indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it represents may be the one or
the other; and the controversy is, in fact and in law, between those persons suing in their corpo-
rate character, by their corporate name, for a corporate right, and the individual against
whom the suit may be instituted.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
49 Warren, supra note 35, at 89.
50 Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86. Corporations were theoretically barred from federal diver-
sity jurisdiction early in our nation's history. The Supreme Court, in Deveaux, held that a corporation
was a citizen of every state in which any person associated with the enterprise, including a share-
holder, was a citizen. Id. See supra note 7 for evolution of the Court's theory on diversity jurisdiction
as it applies to corporations.
51 57 U.S. 314 (1853). While Marshall is considered the seminal case granting corporate citizen-
ship for diversity purposes, it was preceded by and gave meaning to two other Supreme Court rul-
ings. See Rundle v. Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852); Louisville,
Cincinnati and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
52 The Aarshall Court did so by creating the fiction that every shareholder of a corporation
would be presumed a citizen of the corporation's state of incorporation. Marshall, 57 U.S. at 329.
The Court reasoned that while logic and syllogism may deprive parties of the use of federal court,
practical realities militate toward a "corporate" citizenship. See id. at 327-29. Corporate citizenship
in the state of incorporation and the state of the corporation's principal place of business was legisla-
tively granted in 1956.
Such corporate "citizenship" is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). Section 1332(c) states, in rele-
vant part:
(c) For purposes of this section .... a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state by
which it has been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
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While the general rule for diversity jurisdiction in cases involving an
unincorporated association requires consideration of the citizenship of
all the association's members, 53 the Supreme Court has followed an al-
ternative approach on two occasions-Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. and
Navarro Savings Association v. Lee. 54 These two cases recognize the neces-
sity of construing associations based on substance and not merely form.
Federal courts have construed diversity jurisdiction, as it applies to lim-
ited partnerships, in two distinct ways.
II. Two Current Theories on Determining Citizenship of Limited
Partnerships for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction and Its
Unification Under Carden v. Arkoma Associates
A. Mandatory Consideration
As far back as 1889, the Supreme Court discussed how diversity ju-
risdiction should be construed with respect to unincorporated associa-
tions. 55 In Chapman v. Barney,56 the Court held that ajoint stock company
was not a citizen of its state of formation but was a citizen of every state
in which one of its members was a citizen.5 7 Chapman was affirmed later
in Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,58 where the Court held that a
limited partnership association 59 was a citizen of all the states in which
one of its partners was a citizen.60 These two early cases are the prece-
dential underpinnings of the current "mandatory consideration" rule for
unincorporated associations.
More recently, the Court has followed the Chapman rule in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. 6 1 In Bouligny, the
Court held that a labor union was a citizen of all the states in which any of
its members were citizens. 62 The Court made its ruling based solely on
judicial restraint with no evaluation of the practical arguments raised by
the union.63
53 See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (Court held that without averments of the citi-
zenship of all the members of a joint stock company, there can be no diversity jurisdiction). See also
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
54 See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Puerto Rico v. Russell, 288
U.S. 476 (1933) (corporate diversity citizenship statute held to apply to Puerto Rican business associ-
ation with clear character of a corporation) and Navarro Savings v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980) (busi-
ness trust held to be citizen of state of trustee alone).
55 An unincorporated association is a "voluntary group of persons, without a charter, formed by
mutual consent for purpose of promoting common enterprise or prosecuting common objective."
BLAcK's LAw DicTIONARY 1373 (5th Ed. 1979).
56 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
57 Id. at 682.
58 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
59 The limited partnership association of Great Southern is different from the modern limited part-
nership in that the Great Southern association had only one class of partners while the modern limited
partnership has two. See Elston Inv. Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 438 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1984).
60 Great Southern, 177 U.S. at 457-58.
61 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 153. The Court said:
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the status of corporations
for diversity purposes, how such citizenship is to be determined, and what if any related
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The seminal case applying mandatory consideration to determine
the citizenship of a limited partnership for diversity purposes is Carlsberg
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan Association.64 In Carlsberg, the
Third Circuit considered sua sponte whether diversity existed between the
plaintiff, a limited partnership with one general partner, and the defend-
ant, a state savings and loan association. In dismissing the claim for want
ofjurisdiction and refusing to follow the real party in interest theory em-
bodied in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. ,65 the court said, "[w]ithout
instruction from the [Supreme] Court that an identity of citizenship be-
tween a limited partner and opposing litigants does not destroy diversity,
we are most reluctant to carve out an exception to the complete diversity
standard and the traditional treatment of partnerships with respect to
diversity jurisdiction.- 66 Carlsberg has become the hallmark of mandatory
consideration theory and has been cited and commented on
extensively. 67
The doctrinal basis for mandatory consideration is a logical syllo-
gism based on strict definitional analysis. A limited partnership is an un-
rules ought to apply, are decisions which we believe suited to the legislative and not the
judicial branch, regardless of our views as to the intrinsic merits of petitioner's argument.
Id. (emphasis added).
64 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
65 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). See infra notes 78-79 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Colonial.
66 Carlsberg, 554 F.2d at 1261-62. The court found several points of concern as it refused to
follow Colonial. First, the court was concerned with reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b) dealing with real parties in interest. Rule 17(b) states that a federal court shall look to state law
to determine whether a party has capacity to sue and be sued. The court said that such a use of the
Federal Rules to arguably expand the jurisdiction of the district court would be somewhat violative
of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 82. Carlsberg, 554 F.2d at 1261. Rule 82 states in relevant part:
"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the ... district courts."
FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
Second, the court believed that such a reliance on state law would place federal diversity in the
hands of state legislators. "Also troubling would be the prospect of disparate treatment of litigants
whose ability to vindicate their interests in federal courts . . . would be . . . dependant upon state
law." Carlsberg, 554 F.2d at 1261.
Third, the court was unable to follow Colonial due to the lack of guidance given by the Supreme
Court in this area.
67 See Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988); New York State Teach-
ers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1985); Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman
Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1984); Trent Realty Assoc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn., 657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Carlsberg court noted the lack of commentary on the topic of diversity jurisdiction as it
applies to limited partnerships. See Carlsberg, 554 F.2d at 1255 n. 1. However, commentators have
examined this area and more particularly the Carlsberg decision and not entirely with favor. See, e.g.,
Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnerships, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 661; Comment, Carlsberg Re-
sources Corp. v. Cambria Savings and Loan Association: Diversity Jurisdiction and the Limited Partner,
1978 DET. C.L. REV. 177; Comment, Federal Courts-Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction-Limited Partner-
ships, 16 Duo. L. REv. 221 (1977-78); Comment, Federal Civil Procedure-Diversity Jurisdiction, 27 EM-
ORY L.J. 165 (1978); Note, Limited Partnerships in Diversity- The Effect of Rule 17(b) on FederalJurisdiction,
6 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 271 (1978); Note, Diversity of Citizenship and the Limited Partnership: A "Real Party"
Rule as Federal Common Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 235 (1985); Comment, Carlsberg Resources v. Cambria
Savings and Loan Ass'n: Limited Partners and Diversity Jurisdiction, 13 Tulsa L. Rev. 304 (1977); Note,
Who are the Real Parties in Interest for Purposes of Determining Diversiy Jurisdiction for Limited Partnerships?,
61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1051 (1984).
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incorporated association.68 Mandatory consideration precedents deal
with unincorporated associations. 69 Therefore, limited partnerships are
subject to these precedents and are citizens, for diversity purposes, of
every state in which any of their members are citizens. Mandatory con-
sideration epitomizes "form over substance" reasoning. Today, this the-
ory is followed by the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits.70
B. Real Party in Interest
Two Supreme Court cases indicate that, in certain circumstances,
the mandatory consideration rule should not be used in favor of a more
practical approach. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. 71 involved Russell & Co., a
Puerto Rican business association (sociedad en comandita), which the Terri-
tory of Puerto Rico sued for recovery of assessments to the company's
lands. The Court held that the characteristics of the sociedad en comandita
were so much like a corporation that it should be considered a corpora-
tion for diversity purposes.7 2 The Court reasoned that "[fjictitious [as]
that personality may be, in the sense that the fact that the corporation is
composed of a plurality of individuals, themselves legal persons, is disre-
garded, but 'it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be
acted on as if true.' "73
The Court dealt with an express business trust in Navarro Savings
Association v. Lee.7 4 In Navarro, a Massachusetts business trust lent
$850,000 to a Texas firm for a promissory note secured in part by the
Navarro Savings Association. Navarro and the borrowing firm, as well as
some of the beneficial owners, were Texas citizens. In determining
whether diversity existed between the borrowing firm and the trust, the
Court held that the citizenship of the trust was that of the trustee only.
The citizenships of the beneficiaries were not considered. 75 The Court
reasoned that since the beneficiaries were not liable and did not have
capacity to sue, they should not be considered for diversity jurisdiction.7 6
The Court stated that, "a federal court must disregard nominal or formal
68 Since the present alternatives are corporation or unincorporated association, the choice is
simplistically easy. See infra note 115 for the distinction between limited partnerships and other
unincorporated associations.
69 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chapman and Great Southern
Fire Proof Hotel Co.
70 See Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1988); New York State Teachers
Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1985); Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing
Corp., 731 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1984); Trent Realty Assoc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 657 F.2d 29
(3d Cir. 1981). Arguably this theory is also followed by the Ninth Circuit, see Sage Investors v.
Group W. Cable, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 186 (D. Ariz. 1986); Windward City Center of Hawaii v. Trans-
america Occidental Life Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Haw. 1985).
71 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
72 Some of the corporate-like characteristics the Court cited were that the sociedad may purchase
property, transact business, sue and be sued in its corporate name; its members do not have great
personal interests in the entity's business; it is created by irticles filed as public records; it endures
beyond the withdrawal of some of its members; and management may be vested in those who partici-
pate with unlimited liability who may exclusively bind the entity. Id. at 481.
73 Id at 479-80 (quoting Klein v. Tax Supers., 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1926)).
74 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
75 Id.
76 Id.
1990] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
[procedural] parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real
parties to the controversy."-77
These two cases clearly show that the Supreme Court is not opposed
to examining the substance of a given claim of jurisdiction. Other fed-
eral courts have shown similar acceptance of substance over form
reasoning.
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 78 was the first case to reach a fed-
eral court of appeals concerning limited partnerships and diversity. In
Colonial, a Delaware corporation brought a diversity action against a New
York limited partnership for negligently maintaining its securities margin
account and for breach of contract. The court held that diversity of citi-
zenship between Colonial Realty and the general partners of the limited
partnership was sufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit noted that New York's partnership law provided that
a limited partner was "not a proper party to proceedings by or against
the partnership. ' 79 This case is the precedential basis for the real party
in interest analysis as it pertains to the citizenship of limited partner-
ships. Russell, Navarro and Colonial teach that mandatory consideration
is not all-encompassing and can be set aside for a more practical
approach.
Real party in interest analysis rests extensively on the legal and prac-
tical position of a limited partner as a passive contributor to the enter-
prise. It recognizes the limited partners' lack of capacity to control
litigation, specifically, the lack of capacity to sue and be sued, as well as
the limited partners' limited liability as to third parties. Today, the the-
ory is followed by the Second and Fifth Circuits.80
C. Carden v. Arkoma Associates' Unification
On February 27, 1990, the Supreme Court finally rectified the long-
standing split between the circuits concerning the proper standard to ap-
ply to determine the citizenship of a limited partnership when
determining diversity jurisdiction. In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,8 an Ari-
zona limited partnership brought a contract action in diversity. Carden
and Leonard Limes, Louisiana citizens, moved to dismiss because one of
Arkoma's limited partners was a Louisiana citizen. The Eastern District
77 Id. at 461.
78 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
79 Id. at 183 (citing N.Y. PARTNERSHip LAW § 115 (McKinney 1988)).
80 See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 874 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, I 10 S.Ct. 1015 (1990);
Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1986);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). Arguably this theory has support
in the D.C. Circuit, see Gordon-Maizel Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leroy Prod., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 188
(D.D.C. 1986) (holding real party in interest); Conroy v. Winn, 581 F. Supp. 1280 (D.D.C. 1984)
(holding mandatory consideration); the Sixth Circuit, see Bedill v. H.R.C Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732 (D.
Ky. 1981) (holding mandatory consideration); Williams v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Tenn. 1980) (holding real party in interest); and the Tenth Circuit, see Kansas Baptist Convention v.
Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, 703 F. Supp 73 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding mandatory considera-
tion); Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 742 (D. Okla. 1982) (holding real party in interest).
81 58 U.S.L.W. 4243 (1990).
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of Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit found diversity to be complete based
on reference to the citizenship of Arkoma's general partners. 82
Justice Scalia, writing for the five-member majority, held fast to "the
doctrinal wall of Chapman v. Barney" 83 and the mandatory consideration
theory. In doing so, Scalia wrote, "[w]e adhere to our oft-repeated rule
that diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against the entity depends on the
citizenship of 'all its members.' "84
Justice O'Connor, writing for the four-member minority, based her
opinion of a finding that "limited partners are not real parties to the con-
troversy and, therefore, should not be counted for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction." 85 O'Connor also points out that formal parties should not
be used to obviate federal jurisdiction.86 O'Connor then ties the case at
bar to Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. 8 7 In doing so, O'Connor takes the ma-
jority's premise that the sociedad en comandita was an "exotic creation of
the civil law"88 and answers that "it [the sociedad] is yet one of the many
forms of the limited partnership descended from the ancient French So-
ciete as is the modem limited partnership adopted in this country." 89
O'Connor concludes that treatment of a limited partnership as a non-
entity in light of Russell "is justified neither by our precedents nor by
historical and commercial realities."
90
EvenJustice Scalia admitted that a congressional change might be in
order. He stated:
The District Court there [Bougligny] had upheld removal because it
could devine "'no common sense reason for treating an unincorpo-
rated national labor union differently from a corporation,' " 382 U.S.,
at 146, and we recognized that that contention had "considerable
merit," id., at 150. We concluded, however, that "[w]hether unincor-
porated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the status of corpora-
tions for diversity purposes," id., at 153, is "properly a matter for
legislative consideration which cannot adequately or appropriately be
dealt with by this Court," id., at 147. In other words, having entered
the field of diversity policy with regard to artificial entities once (and
forcefully) in Letson, we have left further adjustments to be made by
Congress." 9 1
Therefore, Congress should see the limited partnership for what it
is-a pseudo-corporation-the functional equivalent of a corporation for
diversity purposes. 92 Legislation to this end would relieve courts of the
82 It
83 Garden, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4244.
84 lIt at 4246 (quoting Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 622 (1889)).
85 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
86 Id. at 4247 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421,
451 (1823)).
87 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
88 Garden, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4244 (quoting United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bou-
ligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965)).
89 Carden, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4249 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 4246.
92 Of course, it may be necessary for the federal courts to act first and have Congress follow their
lead. See supra note 7 for the evolution of corporate diversity status.
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constraints of the unmerited, simplistic reasoning underlying the
mandatory consideration theory, and the need to search each case for a
state law basis for applying the real party in interest theory. Such legisla-
tion would allow courts to honestly treat the limited partnership as the
modern, sophisticated business entity which it is.
III. Limited Partnerships: Pseudo-Corporations
While the rules governing the determination of diversity of citizen-
ship in federal courts are aimed at limiting federal courts' jurisdiction, 93
these rules should recognize the true structure of business entities in the
modern business world. 94 The limited partnership in the United States is
now a strong, viable alternative to the corporation. Furthermore, the
volume of business and the sheer number of limited partnership interests
have greatly increased in the last ten years. 95 Congress should therefore
modify the diversity rules to recognize that a limited partnership, while
not a corporation, is a hybrid form96 of unincorporated business entity
worthy of distinctive treatment for diversity purposes.
A. Filing Requirement
At the most basic level, a limited partnership is like a corporation in
that it must file a certificate of limited partnership with the appropriate
office in the state where the limited partnership is organized. This filing
requirement is set forth in both the ULPA and the Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act (RULPA). 97
93 See supra notes 4-5.
94 See supra note 7.
95 Originally, limited partnerships in the United States were used in real estate as well as oil and
gas ventures. Limited partnerships today, however, are used in areas ranging from these traditional
areas to research and development, equipment leasing, racehorse ownership and motion pictures.
See generally G. HAIGHT, THE NEW LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT ADVISOR: A GUIDE TO SUPERIOR
RETURNS THROUGH TODAY'S LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (1987) [hereinafter SUPERIOR RETURNS].
The financial scope of limited partnerships has also grown in this decade due, in part, to the
expanded use of MLPs. Predictions indicated that 1988 would be the first year of decline in the sale
of limited partnership interests since 1975. Partnership Sales Surge Seen Ending, 165 J. oF AcCT. 18
(Apr. 1988). Sales in 1987 reached $13.5 billion with MLPs accounting for $2.9 billion themselves.
Id. Forbes reported that according to The Stanger Report, "the bible of tax shelters," there had been
$I 1 billion in MLP interests sold to the public since 1981. Rudnitsky, Old Vinegar in New Bottles, 138
FORaES, Oct. 20, 1986, at 36.
As far as membership, a table from Barrons in 1985 listed five MLPs that were currently operat-
ing. Those five had total limited partnership units of 281,142,021. Tell, Hottest Thing in Oil: A Look
at Master Limited Partnerships, 65 BARRONS, Oct. 7, 1985, at 20. See also Barker, Another Part of the Forest:
A Fresh Growth of Limited Partnerships, 66 BARRONS,Jan. 23, 1986, at 13 (discussing ITT's initial public
offering of five million limited partnership units that immediately began trading on the New York
Stock Exchange).
Further, partnership interests have begun their own over-the-counter market similar to NAS-
DAQ. National Partnership Exchange or NAPEX is a service based in St. Petersburg, Florida that
matches partnership sellers with partnership buyers. See generally Vinocur, The Aarket of Secondhand
Partnership Shares, 67 BARRONS, Feb. 23, 1987, at 66.
96 See Mesa, 797 F.2d at 240 ("A limited partnership is also neither corporation nor association
but a similar hybrid." [Analogyzing to Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 485 (1980)]).
97 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 2; RULPA, supra note 32, § 201.
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Initially, this formality would seem to be insignificant. However, fil-
ing is the means by which a limited partnership comes into existence. 98 Courts
will not declare an entity a defacto 'limited partnership based on the deci-
sion of one or more of the partners to not participate in the management
or control of the partnership's business. 99 Like a corporation that is
given its existence by statute, a limited partnership is a creature of legis-
lative enactment. 100
Further, under the ULPA, the certificate of limited partnership that
must be sworn out includes, among other things, the amount and charac-
ter of property contributed by each limited partner.101 This provision is
similar to the requirement that a corporation's capital structure be in-
cluded in its Articles of Incorporation.10 2
This filing provision, while seemingly only procedural, "creates" a
limited partnership in the same way Articles of Incorporation "create" a
corporation. A limited partnership is a creature of legislative enactment
while a general partnership is a creature of personal acquiescence.1 03
98 This is unlike a general partnership which is a consensual relationship that can come into
existence without any filing or even a written partnership agreement. See In re Wolsky, 53 B.R. 751
(D.N.D. 1985); In re Toomey, 34 B.R. 35 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
99 Under the ULPA, filing is a condition precedent to the creation of any limited partnership.
See, e.g., Grenada Bank v. Willey, 705 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983) (Tennessee
Law); Heritage Hills v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 601 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1979) (Arizona Law); Peerless
Mills, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1975) (New York Law); Filesi v. United
States, 352 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1965) (Maryland Law); United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.
1961) (Nevada Law); Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 932 (1959) (Utah Law); Direct Mail Specialist, Inc. v. Brown, 673 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Mont.
1987); In re Westover Hills Ltd., 46 B.R. 300 (D. Wyo. 1985); Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724
(E.D.Pa. 1975), afftd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977); Franklin v. Rigg, 143 Ga. App. 60, 237 S.E.2d 526
(1977); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Christoph, 107 Ill. App.3d 183, 437 N.E.2d 658 (1981); Atlanta
Stove Works v. Keel, 255 N.C. 421, 121 S.E.2d 607 (1961); Voudouris v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 560
S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Wisniewski v. Johnson,' 233 Va. 141, 286 S.E.2d 223 (1982);
Dwinell's Cent. Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel, 21 Wash. App. 929, 587 P.2d 191 (1977).
The RULPA specifically provides that filing of a Certificate of Limited Partnership is necessary to
form a limited partnership. See RULPA, supra note 32, § 201.
100 See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT [hereinafter RMBCA] §§ 2.01, 2.03 (1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1983). This is unlike general partnerships which are merelygoverned by
state law and do not owe their existence to state law. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter
UPA] § 6(l), 6 U.L.A. 1, 22 (1914). "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit." Id. (emphasis added). Conversely, limited partnerships must
conform to state law to exist, see ULPA, supra note 27, § 1; RULPA, supra note 32, § 201, and are then
also governed by state law.
101 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 2.
102 The analogy goes further in that the Delaware Corporation statute requires delineation, like
the ULPA, of the capital structure of the respective entities. Compare ULPA, supra note 27, § 2 with
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1988). The newer statutes, such as the RMBCA and the RULPA,
create a more streamlined approach to registration by omitting the capital structure. Compare
RULPA, supra note 32, § 201 with RMBCA § 2.02.
103 Simply stated, this comparison can be seen by the statutory definitions of these two business
entities. A general partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." UPA, supra note 100, § 6. Conversely, a limited partnership .is "a partnership
formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2, having as members one or more
general partners and one or more limited partners. ULPA, supra note 27, § I (emphasis added).
The RULPA also adds the statutory obligation to the definition. See RULPA, supra note 32, § 101 (7).
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B. Passivity-Lack of Control of the Business
Another characteristic which both limited partnerships and corpora-
tions have is the investor's lack of participation in the conduct of the
business. From the early stages of development of the limited partner-
ship entity, a limited partner was considered merely an investor.10 4 To-
day, in the same manner, a limited partner is not brought on board for
his business expertise or savvy, but is brought on to give the partnership
capital in the form of cash, property or services. 10 5
A limited partner is not given a choice of whether to be involved in
the management of the business. 10 6 The essence and benefit of being a
limited partner is the limited liability that accompanies such a position. As
stated in the ULPA, "[a] limited partner shall not become liable as a gen-
eral partner unless . . .he takes part in the control of the business."' 0 7
The RULPA has an analogous provision. 08
The restriction against participation in the workings of the business
is even more restrictive than that placed on a shareholder of a corpora-
tion. A shareholder can be an officer or director of a corporation or
both. Often, directors must hold shares in the corporation. 10 9 General
partners, on the other hand, have no legal or practical restrictions on
their business activities. This business participation restriction makes a
limited partner analogous to a corporate stockholder and thereby tight-
ens the analogy between limited partnerships and corporations.
C. Security Status-MLPs
One of the most compelling reasons for recognizing a limited part-
nership as a pseudo-corporation is the status of limited partnership inter-
ests as securities under federal securities law. Associated with this status
is the evolution of the publicly traded master limited partnership
(MLP)."lo
104 See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of limited
partnerships.
105 See RULPA, supra note 32, § 10 1(2).
106 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 7; RULPA, supra note 32, § 303. It is true that a limited partner
can also be a general partner. However, his/her involvement in the business is in the capacity of a
general partner and not a limited partner. See ULPA, supra note 27, § 12.
107 ULPA, supra note 27, § 7. See, e.g., Kellis v. Ring, 92 Cal. App.3d 854, 155 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1979); In re Estate of Hall, 517 Pa. 115, 535 A.2d 47 (1987).
108 RULPA, supra note 32, § 303.
109 In a practical sense, ownership of, or at least connection with, stock in a corporation is neces-
sary to be elected to the board of directors. This is due to the fact that voting for corporate directors
is based on ownership of shares of stock.
110 A master limited partnership (MLP) is a conglomerate of limited partnerships. See supra note 8
for the definition of a limited partnership. A master limited partnership can be formed in three ways:
roll-up, roll-in, roll-out.
A roll-up MLP "raises capital through the issuance of securities (master limited partnership
units) and uses these funds to acquire the interests of several smaller limited partnerships." SUPE-
RIOR RETURNS, supra note 95, at 7. This organization is used primarily in the oil and gas industry. Id.
A roll-in MLP "uses proceeds from primary offerings to purchase new or additional investment
assets themselves rather than limited partnership interest." Id. This organization uses the market as
a funding source and is greatly analogous to a syndicate situation. Id.
A roll-out MLP "is similar to a corporate divestiture." Id. This organization is used to spin off
divisions of corporations. A corporation will set up a MLP and then sell a division's assets to the
MLP. Id.
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A limited partnership interest is an investment contract "security" as
defined by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Howey. 111 Conversely, general
partnership interests are not usually considered securities.1 12 Therefore,
the two interests are distinct and unique. A general partner is an integral
part of the business and his interest does not meet 'the investment/non-
participation requirements of the investment contract analysis. Con-
versely, a limited partner is merely a source of capital like a corporate
shareholder and his interest does meet the Howey investment contract
definition.
On a deeper level, the 1980s spawned the growth of the MLP and
the public trading of limited partnership interests.1 13 Further, an exten-
sive, national public market for partnership interests, including national
exchange trading has been created. 114 With these recent developments,
the limited partnership has emerged as the new business enterprise and
should be seen as a unique business entity for diversity purposes rather
than being grouped under the generic category of "unincorporated
association."" 15
D. Lack of Capacity to Sue and Be Sued-Derivative Actions
Under the ULPA, limited partners do not have capacity to sue or be
sued on behalf of the partnership. 1 6 This restriction is expressly pro-
vided in the ULPA and can be inferred from the RULPA provision that
limited partners are not liable for the debts of the partnership. 117
The RULPA goes a step further and allows limited partners to initi-
ate derivative claims on behalf of the partnership." 18 The RULPA's grant
111 328 U.S. 293 (1946). As set out in Howey, an investment contract is a "security" when there is
an "invest[ment] [of] money in a common enterprise with the expectation [of] a profit solely through
the efforts ... of some one other than themselves." Id. at 298-99. Limited partners fit nicely into
this definition in that they invest money with the general partner(s) in an enterprise common to all.
Limited partners expect profits, and any generation of profits is made by the general partners' run-
ning of the business. See, e.g., Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Baranski v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 108 S.Ct. 2824 (1988); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1986).
112 Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,423-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (court
held that where one retains control over investment there is not the reliance on others required
under Howey and its progeny).
113 See generally Vinocur, Master Partnerships, REITs Both Gain From Tax Reform, 66 BARRONS, Oct.
26, 1988, at 78; Schiffres, Real-estate Deals That Still Work, 101 U.S. NEws & WORLD RE'r., Sept. 27,
1988, at 59; Sonenclar, To Catch a Rising Star, 155 FINANCIAL WORLD, June 24, 1986, at 46. See supra
note 110.
114 See supra note 110.
115 The key difference between the limited partnership and other unincorporated associations
(general partnership, labor unionjoint stock company) is the class structure involved. Limited part-
nerships have two classes of partners, general and limited. Each of these classes have distinct duties
and liabilities. The others have only one class of members. All members of the other associations
have analogous duties and liabilities and therefore stand apart from the hierarchy of the limited
partnership. This hierarchy is greatly similar to the corporation/shareholder hierarchy.
116 This is the basis for the real party in interest theory. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying
text. See also note 66 for a discussion of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) and real party analysis as it relates to
procedural rules.
117 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 26; RULPA, supra note 32, § 303.
118 See RULPA, supra note 32, §§ 1001-1004. General partners have no such right in a general
partnership due to the aggregate nature of the association. See UPA, supra note 100, commissioner's
prefatory note. This creates the logical impossibility of a general partner having to sue himself so as
to sue the partnership as a whole, due to the joint and several liability of general partners. See UPA,
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of derivative power of limited partners is greatly similar to the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act's provisions for shareholder derivative
proceedings. "19
Thus, in this particular legal area, the posture of a limited partner is
identical to a corporate shareholder. Neither have capacity to sue or be
sued by third party creditors, and both have capacity to sue on behalf of
their respective organization derivatively. Again, the limited partnership
resembles a corporation more than any other unincorporated
associations.
Based on these common threads, there is a strong basis in law for
calling a limited partnership a pseudo-corporation and granting it a sta-
tus for diversity purposes that is comparable to a corporation's status.
IV. Diversity Determination Based on State of Organization and
Principal Place of Business-Policy Considerations
This Note argues that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a lim-
ited partnership is a pseudo-corporation and should be viewed as the
functional equivalent of a corporation in determining its citizenship.
Thus, as an "entity," a limited partnership's citizenship should be deter-
mined by its state of organization and its principal place of business. 120
The supporting and countervailing policy concerns surrounding the
adoption of such a rule are considered below.
A. Supporting Policy Considerations
As argued above, today's limited partnership is, to a great extent,
analogous to a corporation. 12' Given the modem status of the limited
partnership as a business entity, Congress should give it a unique pos-
ture in determining diversity jurisdiction. 22 This argument is not in-
tended to suggest that a limited partnership is a corporation. There
certainly are differences. However, between the extremes of corpora-
tions on the one side and the generic category of unincorporated associa-
tions on the other, the practical status of limited partnerships falls nearer
the corporate end of the spectrum.' 23 Like corporations, limited part-
nerships are groupings of people. Such groupings, however, should not
be "labeled" according to considerations of mere form with no consider-
supra note 100, § 15. Cf Sertich v. Moorman, 159 Ariz. 311, 767 P.2d 34 (1988). Further, a partner
cannot sue for the partnership individually due to the prohibition of a partner having authority to
submit a partnership claim to arbitration or reference. See UPA, supra note 100, § 9.
119 See RMBCA § 7.40. This limited partners' right to bring derivative claims against the limited
partnership itself creates an "entity" definition for a limited partnership. This is contrary to the
unincorporated association "aggregate" theory.
120 One way of achieving this end would be the addition of 28 U.S.C. § 133 2 (e) which could read:
(e) For purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a limited partnership, filed and existing in compliance
with applicable state law, shall be deemed a citizen of its state of organization and the state of its principal place of
business.
121 See supra notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
122 Of course, when discussing the possible prejudice to limited partnerships in not allowing
them access to federal court, there is a possible commensurate prejudice to parties seeking adjudica-
tion against a limited partnership.
123 See supra note 115 for discussion of the distinction between limited partnerships and other
unincorporated associations.
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ation of substance, as corporations were historically classified. 124 When
viewed practically, and not on the basis of academic definitions, the true
corporate-like nature of limited partnerships is obvious.
Further, with the advent of MLPs, limited partnerships can now be
conglomerates with hundreds of limited partners.125 While many limited
partnerships of expanded size are national in concern, they are effectively
barred from a national forum to adjudicate their causes.' 26
The same evolution that took place with corporations, 27 has taken
place with limited partnerships. There has been confusion in the courts;
there has been strict definitional analysis. The final step in the evolution
toward a more appropriate treatment of limited partnership diversity is
for Congress to recognize the national scope of limited partnerships,
their evolved similarities with corporations and legislate that a limited
partnership's citizenship for diversity jurisdictional purposes is its state
of organization and its principal place of business.
In a practical sense, limited partners are not a factor in a limited
partnership's business relationships. Limited partners do not take part
in control of the business and third parties are rarely exposed to these
people.i28 Instead, third parties deal almost exclusively with general
partners. Thus, it is reasonable for third parties to rely on their relation-
ships with general partners because they know limited partners are not
liable to them, absent extraordinary circumstances. 129 Accordingly, the
ULPA specifically provides that limited partners are not proper parties in
an action by or against the limited partnership.'3 0 Afortiori they should
not be considered when determining diversity.
Due to this exclusive reliance on general partners, third parties
would not be prejudiced if limited partners were not considered in deter-
mining the limited partnership's citizenship for diversity purposes. Most
large limited partnerships have relatively few general partners and those
parties do not change.' 3 ' Therefore, their identity is readily ascertain-
able. Conversely, the identity of limited partners, especially in large
MLPs, is not as readily ascertainable. 132 This places a third party in a
124 See supra note 7.
125 See supra note 95. See infra note 126.
126 The more national in membership a limited partnership becomes, the more it should be al-
lowed access to the federal courts due to the national nature of its membership. The ironic twist of
this, however, is that as a limited partnership's membership grows the very forum that should be
opened to it is, closed due to the current tests for a limited partnership's citizenship.
127 See supra note 7.
128 RULPA, supra note 32, § 303 gives a list of activities in which limited partners can engage
without being considered as having taken part in control of the business. Although a limited partner
may act as an agent for the limited partnership, Id. at § 303(b)(1), a limited partner's name may not
be used to induce belief on the part of third parties that a limited partner is a general partner. Id. at
§§ 303(d), 102(2).
129 Such extraordinary circumstances would include a limited partner taking part in control of the
limited partnership's business. ULPA, supra note 27, § 7; RULPA, supra note 32, § 303.
130 See ULPA, supra note 27, § 26.
131 Absent a right to do so granted in the certificate of limited partnership, any change in general
partners triggers a dissolution of the limited partnership. ULPA, supra note 27, § 20; RULPA, supra
note 32, § 801.
132 See Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas, 797 F.2d 238, 243 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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position of not knowing with whom he is dealing and makes the use of
limited partners' citizenships prejudicial.' 33 This makes reliance on lim-
ited partners' citizenships, in a practical effect, more prejudicial to third
parties.
B. Countervailing Policy Considerations
In rebuttal to the policy considerations supporting reform of limited
partnership diversity rules, the Supreme Court has clearly stated: "[w]e
have never held that an artificial entity, suing or being in its own name,
can invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts based on the
citizenship of some but not all of its members."' 3 4
While this "bright line" approach creates a simple test for courts to
administer, it has not been uniformly followed. 135 Moreover, it does not
recognize the pragmatic differences between a limited partnership and
other unincorporated associations. 136
Probably the most recognized form of unincorporated association is
a labor union. The Supreme Court dealt with the question of the citizen-
ship of a national union for diversity purposes in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. 137 The Court held that the citizen-
ships of all the union members would determine whether diversity ex-
isted. However, the Court's reasoning in this case, like its reasoning in
other unincorporated association cases, is distinguishable. A trade
union, like other unincorporated associations, is comprised of a single
class of members with identical rights and liabilities. A limited partner-
ship has two classes of members with unique rights and liabilities. 138 A
national trade union and a limited partnership are not business entities
that fit neatly under a single title like "unincorporated association."' 3 9
Their class structure distinction creates problems in applying diversity.
The limited partner/corporate shareholder analogy makes the limited
partnership too unique to group it with other unincorporated associa-
tions for diversity purposes. Furthermore, the analogy is too strong to
simply ignore.
The generic category of unincorporated association, while still befit-
ting such single class entities as unions, general partnerships and joint
133 Id. ("[D]etermination of citizenship [based on general partners alone] would be both faster
and easier than a process of matching up long lists of members whose addresses may not even be
correctly carried on the partnership's books as of the date of filing.") A determination of citizenship
based on state of organization and principal place of business would make the determination even
easier.
134 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 58 U.S.L.W. 4243, 4245 (1990).
135 See, e.g., Navarro Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980); Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
136 See supra note 115 for a discussion of the difference between limited partnerships and other
unincorporated associations.
137 382 U.S. 145 (1965). See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bouligny.
138 For example, a trade union has only one class of members. The entity itself creates only the
single class. The factual participation of any individual member has no bearing on the rights and
liabilities of those members concerning the association. Conversely, limited partnerships are struc-
turally two class entities. Two kinds of partners derive from the very nature of the entity.
139 See supra note 115 for a discussion of the difference between limited partnerships and other
unincorporated associations.
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stock companies, is not appropriate for modern, national-scope, dual
class, limited partnerships when determining diversity jurisdiction.
Few would argue that the federal courts are not swamped with litiga-
tion.' 40 Therefore, one objection to any jurisdictional reform which
might add to an already crowded federal docket is that state courts are
perfectly capable of handling cases involving limited partnerships and lit-
igating those cases in state court keeps the federal dockets clear. In dis-
cussing this policy consideration in Carden, Justice O'Connor stated,
"[t]his concern is more illusory than real in the context of unincorpo-
rated business associations."' 4 ' Further, diversity reform would in no
way preclude recourse to state courts. In fact, one of the reasons the
framers provided for diversity jurisdiction in federal courts was that the
state courts retained concurrent jurisdiction. 42
As stated, the limited partnership of today can be an economic force
of national scope. 143 If limited partnerships are prevented from seeking
adjudication in national courts, 144 the possibility of local prejudice that
was the original basis for diversity jurisdiction 145 has the opportunity to
rear its ugly head. State judiciaries are procedurally unique unto them-
selves and could provide local parties an unfair advantage by forcing a
national-scope limited partnership to litigate in the local concern's home
forum. It is more realistic to allow a potentially national concern like a
limited partnership to have access to federal courts, with their more uni-
form procedures as embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Evidence.
Conclusion
Limited partnerships are viable investment alternatives with a na-
tional character that sets them apart from all other "unincorporated as-
sociations." Congress should provide these pseudo-corporations, as well
as those seeking to litigate against them, with realistic guidelines for de-
termining diversity jurisdiction. Without Congress providing the federal
judiciary with sufficient jurisdictional power to meet the dictates of a new
society, the federal courts will mire themselves in the edicts of the past
and become less and less effective regarding issues related to limited
partnerships in the United States.
G. David Porter*
140 For articles dealing more specifically with this topic, see, e.g., Edwards, The Rising Work Load and
Perceived "Bureaucracy" ofthe Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Reme-
dies, 68 IowA L. REV. 871 (1983); Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipu-
lation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989); Mills, Caseload Explosion: The Appellate
Response, 16J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1982).
141 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 58 U.S.L.W. 4243, 4249 (1990) (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
142 See supra note 44.
143 See supra note 95.
144 See supra note 126.
145 See supra note 43.
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note and his legal career to his mother, MARGARET L. PORTER (1933-
1989). She embodied the Christian virtues of Love and Compassion. She taught all around her the
necessity of giving and caring from within to have true joy in one's life. Thanks be to God for her
time with us and for His divine grace as she rests from her labors.
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